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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2004, Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer spoke 
at the annual Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference in Chicago. After the 
banquet, the two jurists settled into comfortable chairs on the ballroom 
stage to field questions from Bill Kurtis, a well-known Chicago news 
broadcaster and a law school graduate.1 The Q&A began as follows: 
Bill Kurtis: “One of the pleasing things for me is seeing a Supreme Court 
justice wearing a wireless mike.” (laughter) “Fortunately, we won’t be able to 
take them off.”2 
Kurtis went on in this light vein, noting that C-SPAN had declined to record 
the event and, as a result, hinting a certain intimacy that he could exploit. It 
took a while, but Kurtis got to his question—what happened in the Supreme 
Court’s secret conference concerning Bush v. Gore?3 
Bill Kurtis: “There have been a lot of stories about what happened inside the 
chambers and the conferences, of wrestling with the issue. Justice Stevens, 
let’s start with you. Give us a little feel for the atmosphere inside. And I don’t 
even know the name of the case. Was it Bush versus Florida?” 
(laughter) 
 
1  Bill Kurtis received his Juris Doctor degree from Washburn University School of Law in 1966. 
See Bill Kurtis, CBS CHICAGO, http://chicago.cbslocal.com/personality/bill-kurtis (last visited July 2, 
2012). 
2  Interview by Bill Kurtis with John Paul Stevens & Steven G. Breyer, Assoc. Justices, Supreme 
Court of the U.S., in Chi., Ill. (May 10, 2004) (audio tape on file with author). 
3  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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Justice Stevens: “Well, you’re starting off with a case that I don’t want to talk 
about.” (laughter and applause) “So, I would suggest that you start all over.” 
(laughter and applause)4 
This brief dialog between Justice Stevens and broadcaster Kurtis neatly 
summarizes Justice Stevens’s relations with the news media and the 
media’s relations with him. The misconnection brings to mind the theory of 
parallel universes. This Essay argues that, in the interest of public 
understanding and the Court’s stature, a better connection between the 
Court and the press could be established and that Justice Stevens’s legacy 
as a federal judge contains clues for bridging the gap. 
In the history of the Court, interactions between Justices and journalists 
have ranged from cozy to hostile, with a great deal of detachment in 
between. Political science professor Richard Davis of Brigham Young 
University has noted that Justices have no obligation to engage public 
opinion—or, therefore, the press—in making their decisions. Nonetheless, 
“[f]rom the beginning of the Court, justices have possessed external 
strategies for shaping press coverage and public opinion regarding 
themselves as individuals and the Court as a whole.”5 
Recollections gathered from journalists who covered the Court during 
Justice Stevens’s tenure, a review of press coverage of Justice Stevens, and 
his comments during my interview with him for this Essay suggest that 
Justice Stevens’s posture toward the press was purposively detached. His 
minimalist media strategy (Justice Stevens does not keep a press-clipping 
file)6 fits his personal and professional inclinations towards the media as 
well as the tradition of the Court’s cloister. His relations with the press 
resemble his press-related jurisprudence—respect for the institution and the 
Free Press Clause of the Constitution but no special treatment for the media. 
When asked at the 2007 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference in Hawaii about 
the need for Justices to be more open in communicating their work, Justice 
Stevens replied, “Read what I’ve written.”7 Those who do will find a 
 
4  Interview by Bill Kurtis with John Paul Stevens & Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 2. 
5  RICHARD DAVIS, JOURNALISTS AND JUSTICES xvi–ii, at 186 (2011). 
6  Interview with Justice John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., in Wash., 
D.C. (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Justice Stevens] (on file with author). The finding aids 
for the papers left by the four Justices who passed away most recently, all of whom served with Justice 
Stevens, list files containing press clippings and interviews contained in the collections. See A Guide to 
the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921–1998: A Collection in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives–Collection 
No. 001, available at http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=wl-law/vilxwl00013.xml&
doc.view=print;chunk.id=; Harry A. Blackmun Papers: A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of 
Congress, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2003/ms003030.pdf; 
Register of the William H. Rehnquist Papers, available at http://cdn.calisphere.org/data/13030/tn/
kt4z09r7tn/files/kt4z09r7tn.pdf; William J. Brennan, Jr.: A Register of His Papers in the Library of 
Congress, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2002/ms002010.pdf. 
7  Conversation with Justice John Paul Stevens at 13:25 (C-SPAN television broadcast July 19, 
2007), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/PaulSte#. 
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treasure trove of good writing about engaging legal and social conflicts set 
inside a high barrier of legal conventions. But his career off the bench 
provides another source of evidence for examining his, and the Court’s, 
relations with the press and the public. 
It is hard to argue with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she said, 
“Mass media reporters are the people in fact responsible for translating 
what courts write into a form the public can digest.”8 But, as Justice Stevens 
suggested in his remarks in Hawaii, the ease and effectiveness of the 
digestion are restrained by the Court’s reliance on its written opinions as its 
principal statements of law and its resolutions of cases.9 One result for both 
sides is a wariness, not to say antagonism, arising from a conversational 
void. Endorsing that view, Justice Antonin G. Scalia found an appropriate 
press strategy for Justices in the legendary boxing style of Mohammed Ali, 
known as rope-a-dope: “[H]e described it as a tactic of lying back against 
the ropes and letting your opponent beat the bejabbers out of you until he 
gets tired.”10 
There is, however, a need to rationalize Justice Ginsburg’s theory of 
the media’s role with Justice Scalia’s notion of reality. Otherwise, the work 
of the Court is likely to be viewed increasingly as a black-robed sideshow 
of national political combat instead of an independent branch of 
government. Evidence from Justice Stevens’s life and tenure helps explain 
the barrier between Justices and the press and points to cracks in the barrier 
that each side could exploit. 
Justice Stevens’s limited encounters with the press left him wary. In 
his early private life, during his service as a navy officer, and later as a 
lawyer working for a public investigatory commission in Illinois, he had 
reasons to question the integrity of the press.11 After more than three 
decades on the Court, his first-ever network television interview did not go 
well.12 Justice Stevens had agreed to be interviewed by ABC television 
shortly after attending the 2007 memorial service for President Gerald R. 
Ford at the National Cathedral. He agreed, with the understanding that he 
would discuss his recollections of the late President. Indeed, viewers of 
ABC’s Nightline program were told, “And he’s now remembering the man 
who nominated him to the high Court, President Gerald Ford.”13 But more 
 
8  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 
2121 (1995). 
9  See Conversation with Justice John Paul Stevens, supra note 7, at 12:53. 
10  Justice Antonin Scalia, A Justice Critiques the Press, in POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 262, 263 
(Richard Davis ed., 1994). 
11  See discussion infra Part I.C–D. 
12  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. For a discussion of Justice Stevens’s conflict with 
the media, see also infra Part I.D. 
13  Nightline: Justice Stevens’ First TV Interview at 0:10 (ABC television broadcast Jan. 2, 2007), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/justice-stevens-tv-interview-10334251. 
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than half of the nearly three-minute interview by reporter Jan Crawford 
concerned Justice Stevens himself and his “liberal” leanings on the Court, 
not his remembrances of President Ford, as he had been led to expect.14 
Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence arising from the First Amendment’s 
Free Press Clause and statutes affecting news organizations, like his own 
relationship with the press, was case-specific. In considering the public’s 
right to know, he avoided what he calls “the glittering generality.”15 As in 
much of his opinion writing, Justice Stevens sought to balance interests and 
refrained from using a strict rule applying a media privilege in the manner 
of Justice Hugo Black, who revered the First Amendment’s Free Press 
Clause as a statement of an absolute right that was not to be “balanced” 
against other public concerns.16 
This Essay looks at Justice Stevens’s relationship with the news media 
through two lenses: biographical and judicial. Part I presents anecdotes of 
the news media in his life, from boyhood to the start of his judicial career at 
age fifty. Part II summarizes a sampling of Justice Stevens’s opinions 
regarding libel claims against the news media, one of the essential 
controversies for the media under the Constitution’s Free Press Clause. 
Part III offers four examples of how the news media treated opinions 
written or joined by Justice Stevens and discusses how he responded. The 
responses, which represent communication to the public outside the 
constraints of formal opinion-writing conventions, were mostly offered in 
speeches to law groups. They fall into two categories. In the first speeches I 
cite, Justice Stevens emphasizes the distinction between public–political 
policy preferences and what he saw as his duty under the law. This 
distinction is a defining conflict between the Court and the press. But his 
remarks, unfortunately, in my view, were hardly less formal than his written 
opinions. In the second category of Justice Stevens’s reactions, he directly 
criticized the media’s coverage as misrepresenting the Court’s work. These 
examples reflect a more conversational tone that, I argue, is a welcome 
 
14  Id.; Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
15  John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Judicial Restraint, Address During 
the University of San Diego School of Law Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture Series (Oct. 10, 
1984), in 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 447–48 (1985). The article credits Nathaniel L. Nathanson, one of 
Justice Stevens’s Northwestern University School of Law professors, for the notion of glittering 
generality in the law. Id. at 441. 
16  See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874–75 (1960) (“Neither as 
offered nor as adopted is the language of this [First] Amendment anything less than absolute. . . . To my 
way of thinking, at least, the history and language of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights . . . make it 
plain that one of the primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to withdraw from 
the Government all power to act in certain areas . . . . [T]here is, at least in those areas, no justification 
whatever for ‘balancing’ a particular right against some expressly granted power of Congress.”); George 
C. Lamb III et. al., Special Project, Justice Stevens: The First Three Terms, 32 VAND. L. REV. 671, 702 
(1979) (“Justice Stevens seems to attach great importance to the unique role of the press as a provider of 
essential information. He seems willing to balance the right of free press only against other 
constitutional g[u]arantees, and to subordinate it to other rights only when absolutely necessary.”). 
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addition to Justices’ communication with the public. Part IV, the 
conclusion, looks at Justice Stevens’s strategy towards the media and 
explores how his legacy can inform a discussion about improving relations 
between the Court and the press. 
I draw on research that my colleague, Gene Schlickman, and I 
completed for our 2010 biography of Justice Stevens, books and scholarly 
papers on the Supreme Court and the press, opinions written or joined by 
Justice Stevens relating to the news media, speeches by Justice Stevens, and 
my May 12, 2011 interview with Justice Stevens in his chambers. 
I. A FUTURE JUSTICE MEETS THE PRESS 
A. Depression Headlines 
In a November 2010 interview on the CBS News program 60 Minutes, 
Justice Stevens spoke for the first time on network television about an 
incident in his boyhood that placed him and his family in a glaring media 
spotlight. As the son of a prominent Chicago businessman, young John 
Stevens17 saw his family’s name in dreadful front-page headlines.18 In 1932, 
amid the Great Depression, the prosperous family business dynasty built on 
hotels and insurance underwriting collapsed.19 Chicago newspapers reported 
complaints made by ordinary policyholders against Illinois Life Insurance 
Company, founded and headed by Justice Stevens’s paternal grandfather 
James W. Stevens.20 The story of a rich family seeming to benefit at the 
expense of ordinary people led to criminal charges of embezzlement against 
James and his sons, Ernest J. (Justice Stevens’s father) and Raymond W. 
Stevens.21 The essence of the indictments was that the Stevens men had 
looted Illinois Life and its policyholders to bail out their iconic hotels.22 
 
17  Justice Stevens began routinely using his middle name, Paul, only after he graduated from law 
school. See BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS 55 (2010). 
18  See 60 Minutes: Supreme Court Justice Stevens Opens Up at 4:12–5:25 (CBS television 
broadcast Nov. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Interview with 60 Minutes], available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7096996n; see also Supreme Court Justice John Paul 
Stevens Opens Up, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 5, 2010, 9:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/
23/60minutes/main7082572.shtml?tag=currentVideoInfo;videoMetaInfo (describing the 60 Minutes 
interview and noting “[t]he age of 12 was eventful” for the young Stevens). 
19  This description of Justice Stevens’s family background is drawn from BARNHART & 
SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 23–35. His father and grandfather built and managed the former La 
Salle Hotel and the Stevens Hotel, now the Hilton Chicago on South Michigan Avenue. Id. at 25–27. At 
the time of its opening in 1927, The Stevens was considered the largest hotel in the world. Id. at 26. 
20  See Bare Tangled Finances of Illinois Life, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 16, 1932, at 1. 
21  See Hold E. J. Stevens for Fraud: Seized in His Home, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 28, 1933, at 1; 
Stevens Arrested in Insurance Case: Chicagoan Is Accused of Plot to Defraud Illinois Life of 
$1,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1933, at 19; Vote to Indict 3 Stevenses on Fraud Charges: 
Embezzlement Is Alleged, Also Conspiracy, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 31, 1933, at 3. 
22  Vote to Indict 3 Stevenses on Fraud Charges: Embezzlement Is Alleged, Also Conspiracy, supra 
note 21. 
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James suffered a debilitating stroke and was excused from prosecution; 
Raymond committed suicide in his home before the trial; Ernest, the 
remaining defendant, was convicted and sentenced to one to ten years in 
prison.23 
Chicago newspapers, especially the Chicago Herald and Examiner, 
covered the scandal sensationally and censoriously. Following are the 
headlines of a typical Chicago Herald and Examiner article: “Stevens 
Insurance Crash Goes Back to ‘Dream Hotel’: Clan Leader’s Ambition for 
Gain Undermines Illinois Life; Rosy Prospects Collapse; Parallels Samuel 
Insull Case.”24 The lead paragraph of the article read, “When James W. 
Stevens, then 70, decided to build the world’s biggest hotel on S. Michigan 
Ave., he laid the groundwork for the wreckage of one of Chicago’s largest 
fortunes.”25 
Even the more staid Chicago Tribune extensively covered the story of 
the Stevens family downfall.26 The coverage included a lengthy and 
especially personal feature about Justice Stevens’s paternal grandmother, 
who was divorced from James and unconnected to the allegations: “Ex-wife 
Clings to Old Home of the Stevens Family in Faded South Side Residential 
Area.”27 
John Stevens, the youngest of Ernest Stevens’s children, was at home 
when Cook County States Attorney Thomas J. Courtney staged a headline-
grabbing arrest of John’s father on the evening of January 27, 1933.28 
Courtney said he made the surprise arrest because he feared Ernest and his 
family would flee the country.29 The story made The New York Times.30 
John Stevens was twelve years old. A few days later, on February 11, 1933, 
twelve-year-old John Stevens and other family members were held in their 
home at gunpoint as four armed men claiming to be “federal agents” 
ransacked their home.31 Justice Stevens has a clear memory of the episode. 
 
23  Ernest Stevens Gets One to Ten Years in Prison: Granted 60 Day Stay of Commitment, CHI. 
DAILY TRIB., Nov. 28, 1933, at 2. 
24  Stevens Insurance Crash Goes Back to ‘Dream Hotel’: Clan Leader’s Ambition for Gain 
Undermines Illinois Life—Rosy Prospects Collapse—Parallels Samuel Insull Case, CHI. HERALD & 
AM., Dec. 26, 1932, at 4. Sam Insull was the head of Chicago’s electric utility and had been accused of 
fraud and had fled the country. See JOHN F. WASIK, THE MERCHANT OF POWER 198–202 (2006). 
25  Stevens Insurance Cash Goes Back to ‘Dream’ Hotel, supra note 24. 
26  Archives: Chicago Tribune, PROQUEST ARCHIVER, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/
advancedsearch.html (perform key word search for “Ernest Stevens” for the date range Dec. 16, 1932 to 
Jan. 28, 1934) (last visited July 2, 2012). 
27  Virginia Gardner, Ex-wife Clings to Old Home of the Stevens Family in Faded South Side 
Residential Area, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 26, 1933, at 2. 
28  Ernest Stevens Arrested in $1,000,000 Conspiracy, CHI. HERALD & AM., Jan. 28, 1933, at 1; 
Hold E. J. Stevens for Fraud: Seized in His Home, supra note 21. 
29  Hold E. J. Stevens for Fraud: Seized in His Home, supra note 21. 
30  Stevens Arrested in Insurance Case: Chicagoan Is Accused of Plot to Defraud Illinois Life of 
$1,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1933, at 19. 
31  Bandits Terrorize E. J. Stevens, Family, CHI. AM., Feb. 14, 1933, at 1; U.S. Probes Robbers’ 
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“We were all lined up, and they threatened to . . . shoot everybody 
with . . . a submachine gun,” he recalled to 60 Minutes interviewer Scott 
Pelley.32 
The banner headline in the Chicago American read: “Bandits Terrorize 
E.J. Stevens, Family.”33 The coverage included a front-page photo, from the 
newspaper’s files, of a statue of two boys—John and his brother Bill—that 
their proud father had placed in the lobby of the Stevens Hotel years 
earlier.34 
Alarmed by the reference to “federal agents” in the news coverage, 
Dwight H. Green, U.S. District Attorney in Chicago, announced to reporters 
on February 15, 1933, that he had instructed Melvin H. Purvis to probe the 
Stevens home invasion.35 The Chicago Tribune editorial page speculated 
that the invaders might have been rogue federal agents employed to enforce 
the Volstead Act and other by-then-repudiated Prohibition Era laws, which 
were in their final weeks: “Prohibitionists have made their law and their 
enforcers so intolerable that an act of banditry can be very easily accepted 
as an act of law enforcement.”36 In short, the Stevens story had legs. But the 
newspaper interest in the Stevens family ended abruptly on February 16, 
1933, when Chicago Mayor Anton J. Cermak was shot in Miami, Florida, 
and reporters scrambled to cover that story.37 In 1934, Ernest Stevens’s 
conviction was overturned by the Illinois Supreme Court, which ruled that 
the reallocation of funds among the Stevens family businesses was 
legitimate business practice and that there was no evidence of fraudulent 
intent on the part of Ernest Stevens.38 The Chicago Tribune covered the 
news in a short article buried on page three of the Tuesday news section in 
between a story about models and a fur advertisement. 39 
 
Raid at Home of E. J. Stevens, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15, 1933, at 3; Interview with 60 Minutes, supra 
note 18, at 4:17. 
32  Interview with 60 Minutes, supra note 18, at 4:17. 
33  Bandits Terrorize E. J. Stevens, Family, supra note 31. 
34  Id. 
35  U.S. Probes Robbers’ Raid at Home of E. J. Stevens, supra note 31. Melvin H. Purvis Jr. was a 
young, diligent lawman who had just been appointed chief agent in Chicago for the U.S. Bureau of 
Investigation (today, the FBI) and who would go on the have a spectacular but brief career with the 
Bureau. In 1934, Purvis became a national celebrity through his involvement in the killings by law 
enforcement personnel of Depression Era criminals Charles Arthur Floyd (“Pretty Boy Floyd”), Lester J. 
Gillis (“George ‘Baby Face’ Nelson”), and John Dillinger. See ALSTON PURVIS & ALEX TRESNIOWSKI, 
THE VENDETTA: SPECIAL AGENT MELVIN PURVIS, JOHN DILLINGER, AND HOOVER’S FBI IN THE AGE OF 
GANGSTERS 24, 161–68, 233–48, 262–63 (2009); MICHAEL WALLIS, PRETTY BOY: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF CHARLES ARTHUR FLOYD 262–66, 438–39, 458–61 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2011). 
36  Federal Men Under Prohibition, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 16, 1933, at 8. 
37  See Mayor Cermak of Chicago Is Seriously Wounded as Assassin Fires on President Elect in 
Miami, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 16, 1933, at 26. 
38  People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154, 160 (Ill. 1934). 
39  Ernest Stevens Freed by State Supreme Court: Embezzlement Conviction Is Reversed, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., Oct. 23, 1934, at 3. 
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Asked by Pelley if the trial of his father influenced his work as a judge, 
Justice Stevens said, “It may well have, because it . . . was an example of 
the system not . . . working properly.”40 Regarding the newspaper coverage, 
he told me, “I know there was distress within the family about the fairness 
of some of the reporting . . . I know my dad felt that the Examiner had 
particularly rabble-rousing stories.”41 He also said the headlines about 
Ernest’s arrest for an alleged $1 million embezzlement might have led to 
the home invasion.42 
B. A Young Newsman 
Justice Stevens said he was never interviewed by a reporter amid the 
family’s tragedy.43 His “first encounter with the press” came as a freshman 
at the University of Chicago when he joined the staff of the student 
newspaper, the Daily Maroon.44 
During Stevens’s freshman year, 1937–1938, the Daily Maroon’s 
editor-in-chief was senior student William H. McNeill. McNeill was a 
precocious critic of the university in general—its energetic and brilliant 
president Robert M. Hutchins, in particular—and much of student life. He 
declared a five-point platform for the newspaper, including the abolition of 
intercollegiate athletics, “progressive politics,” and “a chastened President 
(Hutchins).”45 He denounced the college’s fraternity system.46 He organized 
a “[p]olitical [u]nion” for “parliamentary style” debates on national and 
international issues among three campus factions—conservatives, liberals, 
and radicals.47 All of this was too much for many of McNeill’s fellow 
seniors, Justice Stevens recalled: “There was a custom at Chicago back in 
those days of tossing people into the [university’s] botany pond. . . . Some 
seniors tossed Bill into the botany pond to indicate their displeasure about 
the way he was running the Maroon.”48 
At the end of his freshman year, John Stevens joined the Daily Maroon 
staff: 
I just thought that maybe if the paper is off on the wrong track the thing to do 
 
40  Interview with 60 Minutes, supra note 18, at 5:16. 
41  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  William H. McNeill, Editorial, The Daily Maroon Platform, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Oct. 1, 1937, 
at 1. 
46  Id. 
47  Daily Maroon Initiates Political Union for Discussion by All Campus Partisans, DAILY MAROON 
(Chi.), Oct. 12, 1937, at 1. 
48  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. McNeill later became a history professor on the 
University of Chicago faculty. Robert Goodier, A Germ of an Idea, UNIV. CHI. MAG., July–Aug. 2010, 
at 44, 46. 
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is to join it and not fight with it. So, I went to the [Daily] Maroon and asked if 
I could write for the [Daily] Maroon as a sports reporter or something like that, 
with the idea of trying to make it a better publication, and then I got interested 
in the work.49 
In his junior year, 1940–1941, John Stevens became the chairman of the 
Daily Maroon’s board of control for that academic year.50 Unlike McNeill’s 
policy of confronting major off-campus issues and stimulating political 
debate, Justice Stevens’s editorial board declared in October 1940, “The 
Daily Maroon . . . will not have a platform. . . . We shall depart from 
traditional Maroon procedure this year, and devote relatively little editorial 
attention to the problems of the world outside the university.”51 But the 
isolationist policy did not last long.52 By November, with seniors facing an 
imminent prospect of war, the newspaper endorsed Franklin D. Roosevelt 
for President.53 It published extensive articles and letters featuring the 
greatest intellectual combatants on campus as they debated the biggest 
controversy in the nation: America’s participation in the war in Europe.54 
President Hutchins vehemently opposed the U.S. entry into World War II.55 
Mortimer J. Adler, an outspoken academic whom Hutchins had recruited to 
the faculty, was just as adamant that the United States must aid Europe.56 
The Daily Maroon’s circulation soared under Justice Stevens’s leadership 
with this timely and thorough coverage of a pressing national controversy.57 
What’s more, Justice Stevens recalled, “It was a lesson I’ve often learned 
that intelligent people could disagree.”58 
The future Justice Stevens wrote a few editorials, including one 
defending the free press. Another student publication, called Pulse, had 
selected the Phi Delta Theta fraternity as the “Big One” on campus.59 
 
49  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
50  Hankla, Leiser, Rubins, Stevens Head Maroon, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), May 28, 1940, at 1. 
“Chairman” was the most senior staff position at the time. The title “editor in chief” was abolished after 
the McNeill era. 
51  Ernest S. Leiser, Editorial, Daily Maroon, 1940–41, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Oct. 1, 1940, at 1. 
Leiser, who wrote most of the Daily Maroon’s editorials in the 1940–1941 academic year, was director 
of television news at CBS at the outset of the Cronkite era in the 1960s. Robert F. Worth, Ernest S. 
Leiser, 81, Producer; Helped CBS News Move to TV, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at B8; Interview with 
Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
52  See Ernest S. Leiser, Editorial, A Change of Policy, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Jan. 3, 1941, at 1. 
53  Ernest S. Leiser, Editorial, The Maroon’s Choice, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Nov. 5, 1940, at 1. 
54  See Extra: Special War Supplement, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Jan. 27. 1941, at 1; Maroon 
Supplement Features Hutchins, Adler Controversy, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Jan. 27. 1941, at 1. 
55  See Extra: Special War Supplement, supra note 54. 
56  Id. Regarding Aldler’s recruitment to the University of Chicago by Hutchins, see WILLIAM H. 
MCNEILL, HUTCHINS’ UNIVERSITY: A MEMOIR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1929–1950, at 34–36 
(1991). 
57  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
58  Id. 
59  John Stevens, Editorial, Dear Old Fraternite-e-e, DAILY MAROON (Chi.), Nov. 6, 1940, at 2. 
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Losing fraternities in the competition had complained of favoritism on the 
part of Pulse and bribery by the Phi Delts.60 John Stevens disagreed: 
There is absolutely no reason why Pulse should not have the right to plug the 
Number One house on campus. They did so without obligation or coercion. 
The fact that the Phi Delts purchased copies, sold numerous subscriptions, and 
paid for numerous [photo] cuts had nothing whatsoever to do with the choice 
of Phi Delta Theta . . . .61 
Justice Stevens’s evaluation of news media coverage of the Supreme Court 
had its roots in his undergraduate years, when he joined his college 
newspaper and engaged in campus issues big and small, rather than simply 
complaining from the sidelines. 
C. Wartime Secrets 
John Stevens enlisted in the U.S. Navy on December 6, 1941, the day 
before the Japanese attack on the naval station at Pearl Harbor.62 His duties 
as a junior communications officer included interpreting radio signals 
intercepted from the Japanese navy that would indicate ship locations and 
movements.63 It was top-secret work, in no small measure because the 
Japanese did not know that the Allies had broken their radio code and were 
busy reading their messages.64 
“During the war we all took an oath that we would never reveal 
anything that we learned during the war,” Justice Stevens recalled.65 He 
further explained that: “It was expected to be a totally permanent secrecy 
oath. It was only many, many years later that they changed the policy and 
decided they would allow discussion of things during the war. For years, I 
never talked to anybody about the work that I did.”66 
Immediately after the Allies’ victory over the Japanese navy at the 
Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Chicago Tribune published an article 
that suggested the Allies were reading Japanese radio messages.67 Amid a 
flurry of investigations and charges against the Chicago Tribune by the U.S. 
Navy and Congress, the Japanese navy altered its code that August.68 Justice 
Stevens’s unit, working twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, in the 
 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  This description of Justice Stevens’s war experiences is drawn from BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, 
supra note 17, at 36–51. 
63  Justice John Paul Stevens, COMINT Memories of a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, CRYPTOLOG 
(U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, Eugene, Or.), Summer 1983, at 61. 
64  DAVID KAHN, THE CODE-BREAKERS: THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF SECRET 
COMMUNICATION FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE INTERNET 562–64 (rev. ed. 1996). 
65  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
66  Id. 
67  See KAHN, supra note 64, at 603. 
68  Id. 
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Navy Building in Washington, D.C., was forced to respond. “Everybody 
thought that the story was the source of it. . . . It affected our work, but we 
still plodded along,” he recalled.69 
D. Supreme Court Feud 
On the advice of his brother Richard J. Stevens, who had graduated 
from the University of Chicago Law School in 1938, John Stevens—freshly 
discharged from active service in the U.S. Navy—enrolled in the 
Northwestern University School of Law in 1945.70 Near the end of his law 
school years, Stevens won a coin flip with fellow student Arthur R. Seder 
Jr. and thereby obtained a clerkship with Justice Wiley B. Rutledge for the 
October 1947 term.71 The Supreme Court that would assemble that October 
was a cauldron of personality conflicts and sharp differences on legal 
interpretation. Rivalries among the Justices, especially Hugo L. Black and 
Robert H. Jackson, were reported with relish in Washington newspapers.72 
A year before Justice Rutledge picked John Stevens as a clerk in 1947, 
headlines about a “feud” on the Court appeared in the Washington 
newspapers.73 
Several Justices were said to have their favorite reporters. For example, 
newspaper columnist and radio broadcaster Drew Pearson was close with 
both Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson and Justice Douglas.74 Justice Douglas 
also counted among his friends and advisers journalists Eliot Janeway of 
Time magazine and Arthur Krock of the New York Times.75 Justice 
Rutledge, who mostly stayed out of politics and the Court’s internal 
squabbles, kept in touch with veteran journalist Irving N. Brant, a friend 
 
69  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. Years later, documents and interviews with 
Japanese officials revealed that the Chicago Tribune article had not prompted the Japanese to alter the 
code. See KAHN supra note 64, at 603–04. 
70  This description of Justice Stevens’s law school experiences is drawn from BARNHART & 
SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 51–63. Ernest J. Stevens had received a law degree from Northwestern 
University School of Law in 1907. Id. at 53; THE BOOK OF CHICAGOANS: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF LEADING MEN OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 644 (Albert Nelson Marquis ed., 1911). 
71  Interview with Arthur R. Seder, Jr., CEO (ret.), Am. Natural Res. Co., in Charlottesville, Va. 
(May 23, 2005). 
72  See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 296–97 (2010); see also id. at 306–07 (describing the early years of this division on the 
Court). 
73  See, e.g., Thomas Reedy, Supreme Court ‘Feud’ Flares Openly; Jackson Denounces Black as a 
‘Bully,’ WASH. POST, June 11, 1946, at 1. 
74  JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE 
WILEY RUTLEDGE 275 (2004); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 210 (2003); JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & LINDA C. GUGIN, CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. 
VINSON OF KENTUCKY 201 (2002). 
75  FELDMAN, supra note 72, at 188, 317–20 (reporting that the journalists encouraged Justice 
Douglas’s political pursuits); MURPHY, supra note 74, at 163, 184–86, 190, 197 (reporting that the 
journalists quietly supported a campaign for Justice Douglas’s presidential bid). 
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and someone who had helped convince President Roosevelt to appoint 
Justice Rutledge to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
in 1939 and, in 1943, to the U.S. Supreme Court.76 
Justice Stevens does not recall receiving instructions from Justice 
Rutledge about how he and his co-clerk, Stanley L. Temko, should deal 
with inquiring reporters: 
It was perfectly clear that we weren’t supposed to talk. We never did. Neither 
Stan nor I had occasion to. The clerks all ate together in the [Court’s] cafeteria, 
and either we were smart enough or someone told us to be aware of reporters 
sitting at the next table trying to overhear us. We were conscious of keeping 
Court business within the Court.77 
Justice Stevens clerked at the Court during an historic clash of great judicial 
minds, when “[f]riends became enemies”78 and the press followed the 
drama. He was not a combatant but was a front-row spectator. Reminiscing 
about his joining the Court as a Justice in 1975, he said: “I did feel that my 
background and memories as a clerk brought a lot of practices and customs 
of the court back to mind.”79 Avoiding the press was part of that 
institutional knowledge. 
E. Investigating Judges 
After his clerkship, John Paul Stevens entered private practice in a 
Chicago law firm and became active in the Chicago Bar Association.80 In 
June 1969 he was named general counsel to a special commission—often 
referred to as the “Greenberg Commission”—that the Illinois Supreme 
Court created to investigate ethics charges against two of the court’s sitting 
justices, Ray I. Klingbiel and Roy J. Solfisburg.81 The commission, 
comprising senior members of the Chicago and Illinois bar associations, 
was formed by the court to report on sensational newspaper disclosures of 
the justices’ deliberations of People v. Isaacs82 and their alleged conflict of 
interest in deciding the case.83 
 
76  See FERREN, supra note 74, at 166–67, 218–19; see also FOWLER V. HARPER, JUSTICE RUTLEDGE 
AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION 26–40 (1965) (detailing the correspondence that began the friendship 
of the journalist and Justice Rutledge). 
77  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
78  FELDMAN, supra note 72, at xi. 
79  An Interview with Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2007, at 1, 10. 
80  This description of Justice Stevens’s role in the Chicago Bar Association and 1969 investigation 
of two Illinois Supreme Court justices is drawn from BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 
141–44, 162–65. See generally KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE (2001) (chronicling Justice 
Stevens’s involvement in the investigation). 
81  See MANASTER, supra note 80, at 26, 37. 
82  226 N.E.2d 38 (1967). 
83  See MANASTER, supra note 80, at 21–22. 
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Theodore J. Isaacs was a high-profile Illinois political figure84 who had 
been indicted for corruption committed while he was director of the state’s 
revenue department.85 The Illinois Supreme Court had quashed the 
indictment.86 But reporters discovered that Klingbiel and Solfisburg, who 
had voted in Isaacs’s favor, had received stock in a commercial bank that 
Isaacs had helped organize. Newspapers competed fiercely for scoops about 
the scandal.87 In July, the commission’s public hearings, led by Stevens and 
his staff of fellow pro bono lawyers, received front-page treatment.88 Justice 
Stevens has said that his 1970 appointment to the Seventh Circuit in 
Chicago, his stepping-stone to the Supreme Court, resulted from the 
favorable public and professional attention he received in the 
investigation.89 
Stevens avoided stepping ahead of the commission members. He held 
no press conferences and was quoted exclusively from his questions to 
witnesses and other formal statements at the public hearings. The 
summertime work, under a tight August 1 deadline, led to two noteworthy 
press experiences for the future Justice Stevens. The first concerned the 
chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, Walter V. Schaefer. Like many 
lawyers in Illinois and beyond, John Paul Stevens admired Wally Schaefer, 
as he was affectionately known.90 He had been one of Stevens’s professors 
at Northwestern Law and had once offered Stevens a job in the Democratic 
administration of Illinois Governor Adlai E. Stevenson.91 In 1962, President 
John F. Kennedy had considered Schaefer for a U.S. Supreme Court 
nomination.92 
In his deposition taken by Stevens for the Greenberg Commission, 
Schaefer revealed that he had attempted to suppress news coverage of the 
scandal by telephoning a friend, Roy M. Fisher, editor of the Chicago Daily 
News.93 In my interview with Justice Stevens, he said he had not formed an 
opinion about Schaefer’s interference with news coverage at that time but 
said he could see a circumstance—far from the Schaefer particulars—when 
such interference might be warranted: 
 
84  Id. at 6–7. 
85  Isaacs, 226 N.E.2d at 41. 
86  Id. at 54. 
87  See MANASTER, supra note 80, at 4–6. 
88  See e.g., John Oswald & Thomas Powers, Probe Hears 3 Justices: They Say Isaacs Case Given 
out of Order, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 1969, at 1. 
89  MANASTER, supra note 80, at 267–68. 
90  BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 162–63; JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN, ADLAI 
STEVENSON OF ILLINOIS 80 (1976) (citing the nickname “Wally”). 
91  BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 80, 162–63. 
92  Id. 
93  Transcript of Deposition of Walter V. Schaefer at 98–100, In the Matter of The Special 
Commission in Relation to No. 39797, People v. Isaacs, 226 N.E. 2d 38 (1967) (No. 39797) (on file with 
author, courtesy of Kenneth A. Manaster) (taken in Chicago on June 25, 1969). 
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Supposing there’s a matter of national security that was in the court and the 
justice or judge learned that the newspaper was going to publish something 
that he thought was inaccurate and would be detrimental to national security. I 
don’t see anything wrong with the judge calling up and saying you ought to 
think twice about running that story.94 
Stevens was directly involved in a second controversy regarding the 
press during his Greenberg Commission work. Just before one of the 
commission’s final public hearings, the future Justice Stevens agreed to 
give a Chicago Daily News reporter a background interview on upcoming 
witness testimony by a prominent Chicagoan who was not a target of the 
probe.95 In my interview with Justice Stevens, he described the arrangement 
as follows: 
The next to last day of the hearings we had planned to introduce some 
information that reflected seriously on [the witness]. I invited [the reporter] to 
come to the office the night before the day of testimony so I could explain to 
him some of the stuff that was going in[to the public record at the hearing] for 
fear he might not be able to follow it. I thought it would be fair to give him a 
hand on the understanding he definitely wouldn’t publish anything until after 
the hearing. He published it the next morning. That taught me a lesson that 
sometimes you can’t trust reporters.96 
Justice Stevens said he has never forgotten the broken agreement.97 
Before he became a public figure, Justice Stevens encountered the 
news media as a teenager, a naval officer, a Supreme Court clerk, and a 
private lawyer. Each of the episodes presented the media as an institution 
with its own agenda, well separated from Justice Stevens’s own concerns 
and obligations. 
II. JUDGING THE PRESS 
The process by which John Paul Stevens first won nomination to a 
federal judicial post attracted press attention in Chicago, but most of it had 
nothing to do with him. Reporters gave much more ink to lawyer Charles A. 
Bane who was initially nominated by President Richard M. Nixon for the 
Seventh Circuit vacancy that Stevens eventually filled.98 Bane withdrew his 
name from the process in the summer of 1969 amid negative press coverage 
about his alleged discrimination against a Jewish applicant for an apartment 
in his co-op building.99 Justice Stevens’s own nomination and subsequent 
 
94  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  E.g., George Tagge, Nixon to Pick Charles Bane for Court Job: Package Deal Is Reported, CHI. 
TRIB., May 8, 1969, at N3; Bane Picked by Nixon to Be U.S. Judge: Will Fill Vacancy in Chicago, CHI. 
TRIB., May 28, 1969, at 2. 
99  Aldo Beckman, U.S. Tax Case Costs Bane Judgeship, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1969, at 11; Donald 
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confirmation received brief, pro forma coverage in the Chicago Tribune.100 
Judge Stevens installed himself on an upper floor of the Everett 
McKinley Dirksen U.S. Courthouse in downtown Chicago, home of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, where reporters were not welcomed and 
seldom ventured, even for oral arguments.101 “Normally, I never had any 
relations with the press as a judge,” Stevens said of his four decades on the 
federal appellate bench.102 He continued: “Mainly, I thought they ought to 
read opinions instead of trying to save time by getting sound bites from 
judges.”103 Seventh Circuit clerks delivered copies of decisions by their 
panels to the pressroom many floors below.104 
Still, when Justice Stevens began his judicial career on the Seventh 
Circuit in the fall of 1970, the press had been unusually busy covering the 
judicial branch both in Chicago and nationally. Illinois Supreme Court 
Justices Klingbiel and Solfisburg had resigned after the revelations of the 
Greenberg Commission.105 Judge Julius J. Hoffman of the U.S. District 
Court in Chicago had become nationally notorious because of his 
cantankerous handling of the Chicago Conspiracy Trial of seven radicals 
arrested after the 1968 Democratic National Convention.106 In Washington, 
D.C., two federal appeals court judges, first Clement F. Haynsworth and 
then G. Harrold Carswell, had been nominated to the Supreme Court by 
President Richard M. Nixon for the seat of Justice Abe Fortas.107 But both 
nominees were rejected by the U.S. Senate—the first such rejections since 
1930.108 None of this media attention touched Stevens directly. After his 
confirmation, the Chicago Tribune’s first mention of then-Judge Stevens 
came in April 1972, when he dissented from a 2–1 decision that outlawed a 
school district’s ban on sideburns and facial hair among male students 
 
Janson, A Nixon Nominee Accused of Bias Against Jews, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1969, at 51; Michael 
Killian, Bane Won’t Accept U.S. Judgeship, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1969, at 1; Mike Royko, Bane Target of 
Bias Charge, CHI. DAILY NEWS, May 28, 1969, at 3. Justice Stevens’s nomination and confirmation is 
discussed in BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 135–38, 144–57. 
100  See, e.g., Aldo Beckman, 2 Illinoisans Named U.S. Judges, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1970, at A3; 
Aldo Beckman, Percy Backs Lawyer for U.S. Court, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 1970, at W2; 2 Illinoisans 
O.K.’d as Judges by Senate, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1970, at 8. 
101  E-mail from Richard Phillips, former reporter, Chi. Tribune, to author (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file 
with author); see also BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 17, at 158–59 (noting that, except when 
the judges delivered a major opinion, the press usually ignored the Seventh Circuit). 
102  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
103  Id. 
104  E-mail from Richard Phillips to author, supra note 101. 
105  See MANASTER, supra note 80, at 239. 
106  See, e.g., J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER OBSCENITIES: NOTES ON 
THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970). 
107  Stanley I. Kutler, Nixon, Richard, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 687, 687 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
108  Id. 
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without parental permission.109 
A. Private Persons in Public Controversies 
In April 1968 a prominent Chicago lawyer and outspoken civil liberties 
advocate, Elmer Gertz, spotted his name in a lengthy magazine article about 
“a nation-wide conspiracy to harass and intimidate the police.”110 The 
article, in American Opinion, a publication of the ultraconservative John 
Birch Society, called Gertz a “Communist-fronter” and a “Leninist” and 
accused him of participating in “Marxist” and “Red” activities.111 
What Gertz actually did to draw the attention of the magazine’s 
publisher and John Birch Society founder, Robert Welch, was to represent 
the family of a seventeen-year-old boy who had been murdered by a 
Chicago police officer.112 The officer had been convicted of murder in a 
criminal trial at which Gertz played no part.113 Gertz represented the family 
in a civil suit against the officer.114 Claiming that the article was defamatory, 
Gertz sued Robert Welch, Inc.115 A federal jury found in Gertz’s favor, 
awarding him $50,000 for the libel, but U.S. District Court Judge Bernard 
B. Decker set the verdict aside notwithstanding the jury verdict.116  Gertz 
appealed. In reviewing Decker’s decision and writing the opinion for a 
Seventh Circuit panel, Judge Stevens got a chance to have an impact on the 
Supreme Court—and the news media—well before he advanced to become 
a Justice. 
The case, as had several before it,117 tested the limits of the Supreme 
 
109  Robert Davis, ‘A Student Right’: Appeals Court Backs Long Hair, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 1972, at 
15 (quoting from Judge Stevens’s dissent in Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 945–46 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the requirement for parental permission was reasonable because 
“the transient customs of [a student’s] elders” should be tolerated, just as nonconformist behavior should 
be tolerated and explaining that, to do otherwise, “nourishes the pernicious seed of intolerance by 
encouraging confrontation rather than accommodation”)). 
110  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), rev’d, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For excerpts from the magazine article, see ELMER GERTZ, GERTZ 
V. ROBERT WELCH, INC. 1–6 (1992). 
111  Gertz, 471 F.2d at 802–03 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
112  See id. at 803–04. 
113  See id. 
114  Id. at 804. 
115  Id. 
116  Id.; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
117  See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31–36 (1971) (concerning a magazine 
distributor who sued a local radio station for defamatory reporting after he was acquitted at trial of 
charges of distributing obscene materials); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 266 (1971) 
(concerning a political candidate who sued a local newspaper for publishing an article that described the 
candidate as a “former small-time bootlegger” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1967) (concerning a former University of Georgia football coach who 
sued the Saturday Evening Post for reporting that he had conspired to “fix” a football game in 1962); 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376–78 (1967) (concerning the victim of a crime who sued the 
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Court’s landmark press freedom ruling in 1964, New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.118 In its New York Times decision, the Court rejected a libel claim 
asserted by a public official against the New York Times Company, which 
had published an advertisement regarding a civil rights controversy.119 The 
Court ruled that, despite factual errors in the text of the advertisement, the 
First Amendment protected freedom of expression on public issues against 
libel actions by public officials without proof of malice.120 After New York 
Times, federal courts considered several cases alleging false and defamatory 
statements made by the press against persons involved in public issues who 
were not public officials.121 The rule at the time of Judge Stevens’s decision 
in the libel case of Gertz v. Welch, Inc., seemed to be this: Individuals who 
injected themselves into significant matters of public concern, such as the 
conviction of a police officer for murder and a controversy over a possible 
national conspiracy against the police, would find themselves vulnerable to 
the New York Times standard of free expression, even if they were “private 
figures” by any other definition.122 Judge Stevens found that commentary on 
significant public issues, even if it contained false statements that defamed 
a private person, was protected under the New York Times standard.123 
Moreover, Judge Stevens stated that Gertz’s “considerable stature as a 
lawyer, author, lecturer, and participant in matters of public import 
undermine the validity of the assumption that he is not a ‘public figure,’ as 
that term has been used by the progeny of New York Times.”124 To broaden 
the scope of the American Opinion’s assertions beyond the magazine’s own 
reporting, Judge Stevens asserted that “more credible and respectable 
authors” had written on the same police harassment theme.125 As an 
example, he cited a 1966 Reader’s Digest article by nationally known 
 
publisher of Look magazine for reporting that a new play was loosely related to the crime he and his 
family had suffered); Walker v. Assoc. Press, 191 So. 2d 727, 729–30 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (concerning a 
controversial former U.S. Army General, Edwin A. Walker, who sued the Associated Press for reporting 
that he led a demonstration against school integration), rev’d, 389 U.S. 28 (1967) (per curiam); see also 
JOE MATHEWSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 51–60 (2011) (describing the major Supreme 
Court cases leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gertz). Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 
29 (1971), was the most factually relevant case to Gertz, although it was decided after Gertz’s appeal 
was argued before the Seventh Circuit. 
118  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
119  Id. at 256, 264–65. 
120  Id. at 284. 
121  See, e.g., Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 29; Butts, 388 U.S. 130; Hill, 385 U.S. 374; Walker, 191 So. 2d 
727. 
122  See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43–44 (“We honor the commitment to robust debate on public 
issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all 
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether 
the persons involved are famous or anonymous.”). 
123  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 805–08 (7th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
124  Id. at 805. 
125  Id. at 806 & n.10. 
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Northwestern University School of Law Professor Fred E. Inbau.126 Then, 
using the New York Times standard, he found no evidence of malice in the 
magazine’s statements about Gertz: 
Unquestionably, in a close case the policy of encouraging free and uninhibited 
expression is to be preferred over the conflicting policy of deterring 
irresponsible defamatory comment. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . We cannot . . . apply a fundamental protection in one fashion to the New 
York Times and Time Magazine and in another way to the John Birch 
Society.127 
Judge Stevens’s ruling in Gertz might have been relegated to case 
footnotes in subsequent opinions, joining other decisions that had expanded 
the effect of New York Times. But on appeal the U.S. Supreme Court seized 
the libel case as an opportunity to comprehensively revisit its own 
defamation rulings in the aftermath of New York Times. The 5–4 decision in 
the Court’s Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. opinion, written by Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr., reversed Judge Stevens’s ruling.128 The result was a retreat from 
the Court’s trend toward nearly absolute protection of the press against libel 
actions in presenting news and commentary on matters of public interest.129 
Justice Powell declined to acknowledge Judge Stevens’s suggestion 
that Gertz probably was a public figure.130 In the first paragraph of his 
opinion, Justice Powell labeled Gertz a private citizen.131 More important, 
the majority diminished its previous holding in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc.,132 which had created a greater burden for a private individual defamed 
in press coverage of matters of “general or public interest.”133 The Court 
found that state and federal judges should not have to “decide on an ad hoc 
basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’ and 
which do not . . . . We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges.”134 In taking up Gertz’s case, the Court tempered the 
concepts of “public person” and matters of “significant public interest.” 
 
126  Id. at 806 n.10 (citing Fred E. Inbau, Behind Those “Police Brutality” Charges, READER’S DIG., 
July 1966, at 41). 
127  Id. at 807–08. 
128  418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
129  In 1975, at a Chicago reception celebrating the confirmation of Justice John Paul Stevens, the 
new Justice shook Gertz’s hand and said, “You are the only attorney who reversed me in the Supreme 
Court. . . . We decided your case as we did because we thought that was the direction the law was going 
in defamation cases.” GERTZ, supra note 110 at 232–33. 
130  See text accompanying notes 123–24. 
131  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325. 
132  403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
133  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. 
134  Id. 
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“Then, for a time, the pendulum swung back toward tougher libel standards 
for the press.”135 Gertz received a retrial and successfully claimed malice as 
well as defamation by Welch, winning a $400,000 jury award.136 On appeal 
by Robert Welch, the Seventh Circuit upheld Gertz’s award in 1982.137 The 
Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens abstaining, denied certiorari.138 
B. Proving Falsity as Well as Fault 
In his Gertz decision for the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens adopted 
the Supreme Court’s protective stance that existed at that time toward the 
press, only to see it moderated by the higher court in the context of 
reversing his opinion. Ten years after joining the Court, he confronted 
another element of Gertz. This time, Justice Stevens, in dissent, joined three 
fellow Justices who opposed a broad expansion of the press privilege under 
the First Amendment in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.139 A 5–4 
decision in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor crafted a 
new protection for the media: A private figure, exempt from the malicious 
intent threshold of New York Times v. Sullivan, must prove that a 
defamatory statement published in the context of reporting and commentary 
about matters of public concern was false.140 
In 1975 and 1976, a series of articles in the Philadelphia Inquirer had 
linked Maurice S. Hepps, a convenience store franchisor in Philadelphia, 
and his franchisees to purported organized crime figures and to the use of 
organized crime figures in influencing government actions affecting them. 
Hepps and the franchisees sued the newspaper owner and the reporters who 
wrote the stories for defamation.141 
Based on British common law, many state courts had held that, in 
finding libel, defamatory statements were assumed to be false.142 The Gertz 
Court endorsed this traditional view of “defamatory falsehood”: “so long as 
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for 
themselves an appropriate standard of liability.”143 In a sharp departure from 
the Gertz norm, Justice O’Connor wrote for the Hepps majority: “Here, we 
 
135  MATHEWSON, supra note 117, at 60. 
136  See GERTZ, supra note 110, at xii–xiii (indicating that Gertz received both compensatory and 
punitive damages on retrial); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 530–31 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(summarizing the district court’s decision in the defamation action), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). 
137  Gertz, 680 F.2d at 530. 
138  Robert Welch Inc. v. Gertz, 459 U.S. 1226. 
139  475 U.S. 767, 780, 790 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
140  Id. at 776–77 (majority opinion); see also MATHEWSON, supra note 117, at 60–61 (discussing 
the diminished “legal impact of private-plaintiff status” resulting from the Court’s opinion in 
Philadelphia Newspapers). 
141  Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 769–70. 
142  See Norman L. Rosenberg, Libel, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 107, at 581, 581–82. 
143  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–48 (1974). 
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hold that, at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a 
private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that 
the statements at issue are false.”144 
Writing in dissent for himself and three other Justices, Justice Stevens 
attacked the logic and potential effect of the majority’s decision. The 
primary winners from the majority’s “pernicious” decision, he wrote, would 
be news outlets and “character assassins” who maliciously or negligently 
published scurrilous statements about a private individual that could not be 
proven true or false.145 According to Justice Stevens, in the case at hand, the 
negative reporting about plaintiffs Hepps and his franchisees relied on guilt 
by association. Hepps and franchise holders were said to have 
“connections” to “underworld figures” and to have engaged in corruption 
with them.146 One way of proving the falsehood of the newspaper account 
would be for Hepps to demonstrate that the “underworld figures” were in 
fact law-abiding citizens. Acknowledging this possibility, Justice Stevens 
wrote that the truth or falsity of the assertions against a person “connected” 
to the plaintiffs “depends on the character and conduct of that third party—a 
matter which the jury may [under the majority’s ruling] well have resolved 
against the plaintiffs on the ground that they could not disprove the 
allegation on which they bore the burden of proof.”147 
In her ruling, Justice O’Connor agreed that Hepps faced difficulty, 
especially where the newspaper and its reporter were protected by a 
reporter’s shield law.148 But she concluded that a requirement that a plaintiff 
prove falsity was necessary to promote the First Amendment’s interest of 
fostering truthful reporting by the news media on matters of public concern: 
“[W]e hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is 
false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media 
defendant for speech of public concern.”149 
Taking note of the risk that Justice O’Connor’s ruling imposed on a 
private individual whose reputation had been defamed, Justice Stevens 
disagreed: “The Court’s decision trades on the good names of private 
individuals with little First Amendment coin to show for it.”150 Elmer Gertz 
 
144  Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 768–69. Showing that the statements were false was complicated 
by Pennsylvania’s reporter’s shield law, which “allows employees of the media to refuse to divulge their 
sources.” Id. at 770–71 (“No person . . . employed by any newspaper of general circulation . . . or 
any radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, . . . shall be required to disclose 
the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or 
investigation before any government unit.” (omissions in original) (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 5942(a) (1982))). 
145  Id. at 780–81, 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
146  Id. at 769 (majority opinion). 
147  Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
148  Id. at 776–77 (majority opinion). 
149  Id at 777. 
150  Id. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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no doubt was pleased. 
In a general sense, Justice Stevens’s opinions in Gertz while on the 
Seventh Circuit and his dissent in Hepps while on the Supreme Court 
represent two sides of free press jurisprudence—his Gertz opinion for the 
majority siding with press freedom and his Hepps dissent pulling back. But 
a more precise analysis notes, as Justice Stevens did, that in Gertz he was 
an appellate judge ruling under the constraints of prevailing Supreme Court 
precedent,151 notably the New York Times standard. The Hepps case 
confronted Justice Stevens as a Justice, who is empowered to guide the law. 
But, this time, he was unconvinced that the facts of the Hepps case 
warranted the departure from precedent. The two cases tell less about 
Justice Stevens’s attitude toward the news media and more about his belief 
in judicial restraint.152 
III. A JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 
Anyone familiar with artist Andy Warhol’s remark that “in the future 
everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes”153 will understand that 
Supreme Court Justices harbor attitudes about the news media and how they 
should be famous. In his interview for this Essay, Justice Stevens revealed 
one anecdotal example of press strategy at the Court. Neither Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger nor Justice Byron R. White had special sympathy for a 
so-called press privilege under the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause.154 
Yet, Justice Stevens recalled, 
Whenever there was a First Amendment case in which the Court was going to 
uphold the right of the press, [Chief Justice Burger] wrote the opinion himself. 
When there was a case in which they were going to rule against the interest of 
the press, he assigned it to Byron. Byron had to write more than his share of 
First Amendment cases rejecting privilege claims. So, the press did not give 
Byron an entirely fair shake. When you were going to make points by ruling 
 
151  GERTZ, supra note 110, at 232–33. 
152  See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 15, at 438; John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of 
the U.S., Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, Address at the Annual Meeting and Banquet of the 
American Judicature Society (Aug. 6, 1982), in 66 JUDICATURE 177 (1982). 
153  The quotation comes from Warhol’s exhibition catalogue for his exhibit at a Swedish gallery in 
1968. See JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 819 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, Brown 
& Co. 17th rev. ed. 4th prtg. 2002) (1882). 
154  See e.g., DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 336 (1998) (“[Justice White] could, and did, refuse interviews with 
impunity.”); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 
158 (1992) (“Under Burger, the press at the Court had been treated as the enemy or, at best, a 
nuisance.”); see also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (concerning a Massachusetts law that barred nonmedia corporation from spending money to 
influence a public referendum); id. (“Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to 
express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to 
disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge 
the audience by publication and wide dissemination.”). 
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with the press [Chief Justice Burger] would keep the case for himself.155 
I have found no evidence of Justice Stevens currying favor with the 
news media. Yet his press strategy was hardly inert. On occasions, he 
declined to accept the passive, rope-a-dope strategy described by Justice 
Scalia156 and instead reacted to press criticism through speeches to law 
organizations. For example, just a few weeks after the end of the Court’s 
1997 and 2004 Terms, Justice Stevens found ways to counterpunch fairly 
rapidly to negative news coverage of his work in each of the just-concluded 
terms. Speaking to the Clark County Bar Association in Las Vegas in 
August 2005, he rhetorically took a “Mulligan” (second chance at a golf 
swing) for five of what he called his “unwise” opinions and votes.157 But 
rather than revising his work, he drew a distinction between his public 
policy preferences and his duty as an appellate judge: “In each I was 
convinced that the law compelled a result that I would have opposed if I 
were a legislator.”158 With the immunity from popular opinion granted by 
lifetime tenure, he said, “our job is vastly simplified by our duty to allow 
legislatures and executives to fashion policy in response to their 
understanding of the popular will.”159 
Of the five opinions he discussed in Las Vegas, Justice Stevens said 
two cases, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., concerning 
proper court jurisdiction in class action suits,160 and United States v. Booker, 
concerning the technicalities of sentencing guidelines,161 were “of greater 
 
In THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE, Professor Hutchinson cites three opinions written 
by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Burger that concentrated on the “bile” of the news media, 
HUTCHINSON, supra at 382. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (regarding discovery 
proceedings aimed at journalists in libel cases); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) 
(allowing police searches of newsrooms with proper warrants); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972) (rejecting a journalist’s claim to be excused from testifying before a grand jury). 
In Herbert v. Lando, Justice White wrote: 
It is suggested that the press needs constitutional protection from these burdens [of discovery 
inquiries by a plaintiff into a journalist’s state of mind in libel cases] if it is to perform its task, 
which is indispensable in a system such as ours. 
 Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry into the editorial process, 
however, would not cure this problem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability for 
defamation would effect this result, and the Court has regularly found this to be an untenable 
construction of the First Amendment. 
441 U.S. at 176 (footnote omitted). 
155  Interview with Justice Stevens, supra note 6. 
156  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
157  John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Judicial Predilections, Address at 
the Clark County Bar Association Luncheon Meeting (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 1 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 6. 
160  545 U.S. 546, 572–75 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
161  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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interest to lawyers than to members of the general public.”162 A third, his 
dissent in Granholm v. Heald, concerning the end of state restrictions on the 
sale of wine from out-of-state wineries,163 attracted little press notice. But 
two of the opinions he chose from the 2004 Term had generated 
considerable negative press reaction. By reviewing the opinions he wrote 
for the Court majority in Kelo v. City of New London, concerning eminent 
domain,164 and Gonzales v. Raich, concerning medical use of marijuana,165 
Justice Stevens guaranteed national press coverage of his efforts to clarify 
his work on two controversial issues.166 Unlike his written opinions for the 
Court, setting out detailed precedent and reflecting the dense style of 
traditional legal reasoning, his remarks outside the Court allow us to see 
how well a Justice communicates to the public given a second chance in a 
far less formal venue. Thoughts about improved communications between 
Justices and the press benefit from such comparisons. 
A. Home, Sweet Home 
In Kelo v. City of New London, a case from Connecticut about the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision endorsed 
the power of local governments to take private property for use by private 
developers for the public purpose of local economic development.167 The 
ruling sparked immediate and broad public opposition. Public approval of 
the Court sank to a record low 42% in a Gallup poll taken shortly after the 
June 23, 2005 decision.168 The Chicago Tribune’s extensive news coverage, 
commentary, editorials, and letters to the editor about Kelo in June and July 
2005 included headlines such as: “Is Your Home Safe?”;169 “A Blow to 
Freedom”;170 “Eminent Domain Ruling Spurs Widespread Backlash”;171 
“There’s No Such Thing as Home, Sweet Home”;172 and “High Court 
Ruling Steamrolls Rights of the Little Guy.”173 
 
162  Stevens, supra note 157, at 1–3. 
163  544 U.S. 460, 493–94 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
164  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
165  545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
166  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weights Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2005, at A1. 
167  545 U.S. at 488–90. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE (2009) (describing the 
Kelo case). 
168  Lydia Saad, Supreme Court Starts Term with 51% Approval, GALLUP.COM (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/143414/supreme-court-starts-term-approval.aspx. 
169  Editorial, Is Your Home Safe?, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2005, § 1, at 24. 
170  Jim Munkcacsy, Letter to the Editor, A Blow to Freedom, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2005, § 1, at 18. 
171  Kenneth R. Harney, Eminent Domain Ruling Spurs Widespread Backlash, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 
2005, § 16, at 1. 
172  Dennis Byrne, There’s No Such Thing as Home, Sweet Home, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2005, § 1, at 
15. 
173  John Kass, High Court Ruling Steamrolls Rights of the Little Guy, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2005, 
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Justice Stevens, in his Judicial Predilections speech, sympathized with 
the negative reaction to his ruling: “My own view is that the allocation of 
economic resources that result from the free play of the market forces is 
more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run than the best-
intentioned plans of public officials.”174 Setting aside that admission, his 
speech text improved considerably on the text of his Kelo opinion. Using 
636 words, instead of the 4155 words of his Kelo opinion, Justice Stevens’s 
speech summarized the extensive history of the Court’s eminent domain 
jurisprudence.175 He demonstrated that his judgment fell clearly within the 
Court’s precedent.176 He did not reiterate word-for-word any of the text of 
his formal opinion, but instead clarified and simplified the issues and his 
finding. The speech text was briefer and more conversational. For example, 
the text of the opinion reads, “For more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in 
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public 
needs justify the use of the takings power.”177 The speech text is clearer: 
“[W]e have always allowed local policy makers wide latitude in 
determining how best to achieve legitimate public goals.”178 
In another example, the opinion text reads, “As the submissions of the 
parties and their amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using 
eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly matters of 
legitimate public debate.”179 But the speech makes the point more directly: 
“Time and again judges who truly believe in judicial restraint have avoided 
the powerful temptation to impose their views of sound economic theory on 
the policy choices of local legislators.”180 
In his speech, Justice Stevens moved from the more formal to the less 
formal. But there was plenty of room to move farther in that direction, still 
without changing the legal essence of the ruling. Justice Stevens and the 
news media covering the story could have learned much from a Chicago 
Tribune reader, whose letter to the editor was a compact, lucid exposition of 
Kelo in less than 100 words: 
 The banner headline on the June 24 [Chicago Tribune] front page, 
“Eminent [D]omain [E]xpanded,” was dangerously misleading and certainly 
not supported by the story that followed. 
 The Supreme Court simply refused to overturn state laws that have been in 
 
§ 1, at 2. 
174  Stevens, supra note 157, at 4. 
175  Id. at 3–4. 
176  Id. 
177  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005). 
178  Stevens, supra note 157, at 4. 
179  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
180  Stevens, supra note 157, at 4. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 682 
place since the 1950s, ruling that nothing in the U.S. Constitution prevented 
states and cities from determining for themselves what is a “public use.” 
 The law is the same now as it was before the decision. 
 How is that expanded?181 
The three texts discussed in this subpart—Justice Stevens’s Kelo opinion, 
his Judicial Predilections speech, and the Chicago Tribune letter to the 
editor—could comprise the basis for a useful discussion of Supreme 
Court’s news media relations. 
B. Pot and the Commerce Clause 
In Gonzales v. Raich, a 2005 case from California, the Supreme Court 
discussed the scope of the federal Controlled Substances Act182 and 
invalidated state medical marijuana laws.183 The opinion that Justice Stevens 
wrote for a five-member majority focused on the historical importance of 
the Constitution’s Commerce Clause but sparked critical commentaries 
with arresting headlines, including: “Court’s Ruling on Marijuana Reeks of 
‘Reefer Madness’”;184 “Court’s Marijuana Ruling Trespasses on Doctor–
Patient Territory”;185 and “What Were Those Justices Smoking?”186 It also 
yielded sympathetic comments such as: “Not About Pot,” an editorial in the 
Washington Post,187 and a lengthy analysis in the Los Angeles Times, 
“Unconstitutional Cannabis.”188 
Raich is an excellent example of my theme because the case is really 
about two things: medical marijuana use, an obvious topic of interest to the 
press, and the power of the Commerce Clause, a topic that seldom makes 
headlines. Often the Court must deal with publicly controversial subjects in 
terms of constitutional guidelines little known to the public.189 Bridging that 
gap, I believe, is vital to the Court’s independence and its stature as the 
third branch of government. 
In his Judicial Predilections speech, Justice Stevens again revealed his 
own point of view, this time about the use of medical marijuana and the 
 
181  Dennis McClendon, Letter to the Editor, Misleading Headline, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2005, § 1, at 
18. 
182  Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–971 (2006)). 
183  545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
184  Editorial, Court’s Ruling on Marijuana Reeks of ‘Reefer Madness,’ USA TODAY, June 7, 2005, 
at 12A. 
185  Gregory Goldmakher, Letter to the Editor, Court’s Marijuana Ruling Trespasses on Doctor–
Patient Territory, USA TODAY, June 9, 2005, at 21A. 
186  Nick Gillespie, Op-Ed., What Were Those Justices Smoking?, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at B13. 
187  Editorial, Not About Pot, WASH. POST, June 8, 2005, at A20. 
188  Editorial, Unconstitutional Cannabis, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at B12. 
189  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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distinction between his private opinion on the topic and the work of judicial 
review: 
I have no hesitation in telling you that I agree with the policy choice [to 
authorize medical marijuana] made by the millions of California voters, as 
well as the voters in at least nine other states (including Nevada), that such use 
of the drug should be permitted, and that I disagree with executive decisions to 
invoke criminal sanctions to punish such use.190 
But unlike his elaboration of the Kelo decision, in which he attempted to 
clarify the judicial background surrounding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, Justice Stevens’s Las Vegas comments about Raich touched only 
briefly on what he had seen as the constitutional centerpiece of the case, the 
Article I Commerce Clause.191 
In his speech, Justice Stevens, perhaps assuming that the lawyers in the 
room were aware of his Commerce Clause jurisprudence, missed an 
opportunity to convey to a broader public audience the importance of one of 
the building blocks of his jurisprudence.192 Justice Stevens wrote in his 
Raich opinion: “The Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers’ response 
to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself.”193 His speech 
text read: “Unless we were to revert to a narrow interpretation of Congress’ 
 
190  Stevens, supra note 157, at 4. 
191  See id. 
192  Justice Stevens’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence was influenced greatly by Justice Rutledge. 
Rutledge believed that the Commerce Clause was essential to the existence of a national government. 
For an indication of Justice Stevens’s reliance on Justice Rutledge’s views regarding the Commerce 
Clause, see Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 665–66 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25–27 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 
2004) (1947)). In Vendo, Justice Stevens revealed Justice Rutledge’s jurisprudential impact when he 
wrote, “Perhaps more than any other provision in the Constitution, it was the Commerce Clause that 
transformed the ineffective coalition created by the Articles of Confederation into a great Nation.” Id. at 
665. Justice Stevens continued his dissent by quoting the following text from A DECLARATION OF 
LEGAL FAITH: 
 It was . . . to secure freedom of trade, to break down the barriers to its free flow, that the 
Annapolis Convention was called, only to adjourn with a view to Philadelphia. Thus the 
generating source of the Constitution lay in the rising volume of restraints upon commerce which 
the Confederation could not check. These were the proximate cause of our national existence 
down to today. 
So by a stroke as bold as it proved successful, they founded a nation, although they had set out 
only to find a way to reduce trade restrictions. So also they solved the particular problem causative 
of their historic action, by introducing the commerce clause in the new structure of power. 
. . . On this fact as much as any other we may safely say rests the vast economic development and 
present industrial power of the nation. To it may be credited largely the fact we are an independent 
and democratic country today. 
Id. (omissions in original) (quoting RUTLEDGE, supra) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a final 
show of respect for the words of Justice Rutledge, Justice Stevens concluded his dissent with the 
following warning: “Only by ignoring this chapter in our history could we invoke principles of 
federalism to defeat enforcement of the ‘Magna Carta of free enterprise’ enacted pursuant to Congress’ 
plenary power to regulate commerce among the States.” Id. at 666 (footnote omitted). 
193  545 U.S. at 16. 
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power to regulate commerce among the States that has been consistently 
rejected since the Great Depression [of the 1930s], in my judgment our duty 
to uphold the application of the federal statute was pellucidly clear.”194 
It is unlikely, however, that his core belief in the primacy of the 
Commerce Clause was “pellucidly” clear to those upset by the Court’s 
sudden ban on medical marijuana. Instead, the press provided the useful 
clarification that was missing from Justice Stevens’s speech. The 
Washington Post editorialized: “The Constitution’s [C]ommerce [C]lause, 
which provided the foundation for the [C]ourt’s ruling in this case, is the 
foundation of the modern regulatory state, underpinning since the New Deal 
huge swaths of federal law: worker protections, just about all federal 
environmental law, laws prohibiting racial discrimination in private-sector 
employment.”195 Editorial writers at the Los Angeles Times agreed, more 
colorfully: 
For decades, during and after the New Deal, [the Commerce Clause] became 
the all-purpose authority for anything the federal government wanted to do, or 
to prevent individual states from doing. . . . 
 Federalism and the [C]ommerce [C]lause bring out the hypocrite in all of 
us. . . . 
 In the tired arguments of the last century about the courts and the 
Constitution, it has usually been liberals with ambitious national agendas 
favoring a strong [C]ommerce [C]lause that clears away the underbrush of 
state laws in their path. Meanwhile, conservatives have defended the sanctity 
of “states’ rights.” When the issue is the medical use of marijuana, the siren 
song of states’ rights tempts liberals and libertarians, while more mainstream 
conservatives are happy—on this occasion—to see the jackboots of 
Washington come stomping on the prerogatives of Sacramento. Thus Gonzales 
vs. Raich is an excellent litmus test of intellectual integrity.196 
On this occasion, the press, not the Justice, drew the better distinction 
between law and a public policy popular in certain circles. 
C. “Secret Trials” 
Though he did not write an opinion for the Supreme Court’s 1979 
decision restricting press access to a criminal court proceeding in Gannett v. 
DePasquale,197 Justice Stevens took the stage at the College of Law at the 
University of Arizona in Tucson to criticize news media coverage of the 
majority opinion he had joined a month earlier.198 The Court’s decision, 
authored by Justice Potter Stewart, affirmed an agreement between 
 
194  Stevens, supra note 157, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
195  Editorial, supra note 187. 
196  Editorial, supra note 188. 
197  443 U.S. 368, 393–94 (1979). 
198  See John Paul Stevens, The Gannett Case in Perspective, B. LEADER 2, Nov.–Dec. 1979, at 2, 3. 
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prosecutors and defense lawyers to bar the public and the press from a 
pretrial hearing on whether a defendant’s confession and other evidence 
should be suppressed at the upcoming trial.199 Many media commentators 
seized on the majority’s broad ruling that the Sixth Amendment’s “right to 
a speedy and public trial”200 was granted to the accused, not the public or 
the press. In particular, press commentators jumped on text of the 
concurring opinion by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist that read: “[A]s 
the Court today holds, the Sixth Amendment does not require a criminal 
trial or hearing to be opened to the public if the participants to the litigation 
agree for any reason, no matter how jurisprudentially appealing or 
unappealing, that it should be closed.”201 
Editorial writers and columnists attacked. The Washington Post 
inveighed against “Secret Trials,” with references to “the Star Chamber” 
and “the Spanish Inquisition.”202 The Washington Post’s columnist Jack 
Anderson remarked: 
In its continuing war with the press, the Supreme Court so far has shied away 
from infringing on the First Amendment’s guaranteed freedom to publish. 
Instead, its recent decisions have chipped away drastically at the media’s 
freedom to gather the news—a necessary first step that the [C]ourt majority 
evidently feels does not warrant First Amendment protection.203 
A Los Angeles Times editorial, “A Disastrous Assault,” read: “The U.S. 
Supreme Court, turning its back on the Constitution and two centuries of an 
open judicial process, has taken this nation further down the ominous path 
to secret trials.”204 
Anthony Lewis, a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for the New York 
Times and the newspaper’s former Supreme Court correspondent,205 drew 
Justice Stevens directly into the controversy.206 Lewis noted that in the 
Court’s previous Term, Justice Stevens had written a compelling dissent 
about the right of the press under the First and Sixth Amendments to 
acquire, as well as disseminate, information.207 The case, Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., arose from a suit by San Francisco television station KQED to 
obtain camera and reporter access to a portion of a county jail where a 
 
199  Gannett, 443 U.S. at 390–91, 393–94. 
200  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
201  Gannett, 443 U.S. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
202  Editorial, Secret Trials, WASH. POST, July 3, 1979, at A16. 
203  Jack Anderson, High Court Now a Top-Secret Agency, WASH. POST, July 28, 1979, at B12. 
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prisoner had committed suicide.208 The Court ruled in favor of the jailer,209 
but Justice Stevens dissented: 
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communication be free of 
governmental restraints. Without some protection for the acquisition of 
information about the operation of public institutions such as prisons by the 
public at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers 
would be stripped of its substance. 
 For that reason information gathering is entitled to some measure of 
constitutional protection.210 
In a footnote, he acknowledged that the Constitution does not grant a “right 
to receive or acquire information” but wrote that the marketplace of ideas 
would be “barren” without information to exchange.211 
Regarding the Sixth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote, “By express 
command of the Sixth Amendment the [trial] must be a ‘public trial.’”212 He 
explained that imprisonment was part of the judicial proceeding, as was a 
trial, and that the “community at large,” not just the accused, had an interest 
in a fair and open proceeding.213 Columnist Lewis seized on this point of 
Justice Stevens’s argument in KQED: “What goes on in prison is part of the 
criminal justice process that ought to be known to the public, Justice 
Stevens said just a year ago. Yet, astonishingly, he . . . joined the Stewart 
opinion [in Gannett].”214 
In his September 8, 1979 Tucson speech, which was covered the next 
day by national news media,215 Justice Stevens sniped about 
“representatives of the news media who seem to fear that the majority’s 
decision [in Gannett] has removed the cornerstone of our constitutional 
edifice” and “prophets of doom [who] argue that the Watergate scandal 
would never have been exposed if Gannett and other cases had been 
decided a few years ago.”216 He drew a distinction between the First 
Amendment, as he had employed it in defending KQED, and the Sixth 
Amendment, which had been the greater factor in the Court’s Gannett 
decision but had played only a supporting role in Justice Stevens’s KQED 
dissent. In the speech, he acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment was 
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unambiguous in granting the right to an open trial only to the accused.217 On 
the other hand, he recognized conflicting views about the First Amendment 
and a supposed right of the press and public to obtain as well as disseminate 
information.218 Drawing on his love of fictional defense lawyer Perry 
Mason, Justice Stevens noted that trials depicted in the Perry Mason stories 
frequently presented a judge holding private conversations with lawyers in 
the courtroom.219 Such proceedings that bar the press and public, he 
explained, are essential to the plea bargaining process and the consideration 
of sensational evidence that might be suppressed from the trial.220 He 
concluded, “Although much of the debate is unpersuasive, it is all 
constructive. . . . [I]t maximizes the likelihood that legislators and other 
lawmakers will make constructive changes in the rules relating to access to 
governmental proceedings.”221 As he did in the wake of his controversial 
Kelo decision, he welcomed public and legislative awareness of and debate 
about an issue.222 
The public discussion may have had an effect. The following year, in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court significantly modified its 
Gannett ruling by distinguishing between a right to public attendance at a 
pretrial hearing and a public right to attend a trial.223 In the Richmond 
Newspapers case, the trial judge had granted a defense motion to close the 
trial itself.224 Neither the prosecutor nor members of the press in attendance 
had objected.225 But the Court, in a plurality opinion with only Chief Justice 
Rehnquist dissenting, held that the right of the public and press to attend a 
trial is guaranteed by the First Amendment.226 In his concurrence, Justice 
Stevens recalled his KQED dissent and remarked, “[Richmond Newspapers] 
is a watershed case. Until today, the Court has accorded virtually absolute 
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has 
it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any 
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constitutional protection whatsoever.”227 
The very term “secret trials” evokes widespread concern. In an easily 
comprehensible and candid speech in Tuscon, Justice Stevens succeeded in 
placing anxiety about public and press access to trials in the context of the 
Constitution and contemporary legal standards. He spanned, in simple 
terms, the rights of a defendant and the rights of the public. He invited 
further public discussion, which, in my view, was facilitated by his speech 
and by the fact that three other Justices made public remarks about the 
case—an unusual display by Justices on a single issue.228 Finally, he seemed 
delighted to herald the “watershed” decision in Richmond Newspapers, 
easing restrictions on access to trials, which almost certainly was the fruit of 
those discussions. 
D. President Clinton in Court 
In May 1997, Justice Stevens wrote the Clinton v. Jones opinion for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, holding that President William J. Clinton had 
no right, under his claims of presidential immunity or separation of powers, 
to halt a 1994 lawsuit that had been filed against him concerning his 
unofficial behavior as the Governor of Arkansas.229 
The decision was broadly accepted by newspaper editorial writers and 
columnists. The Chicago Tribune editorialized that Paula C. Jones had 
“secured a place for herself in the nation’s constitutional law and history” 
by providing an opportunity for the Court to reject President Clinton’s 
“outrageous argument that the [P]resident of the United States is somehow 
above the laws he is sworn to uphold and enforce.”230 
The New York Times’s Anthony Lewis wrote that the ruling 
underscored “the importance of judicial independence . . . . It countered the 
notion, heard so often, that judges are driven by the politics of the President 
who appointed them. Yes, judges have what Justice Holmes called their 
can’t-helps, the beliefs that are the product of a life’s experience. But they 
do try to be judges.”231 But one prescient conjecture by Lewis was absent in 
commentary elsewhere: 
 Nor do I think the drain of this case on the operation of the Presidency 
should be minimized[—]not just appearance in court, if that happens, but the 
endless decisions on how to proceed. No doubt that is why those who have 
tried to destroy Mr. Clinton’s legitimacy since the day he was first elected are 
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salivating at the Supreme Court decision.232 
Lewis questioned Justice Stevens’s assertion that the ruling would not 
generate, in Justice Stevens’s words, “politically motivated harassing and 
frivolous litigation” or take much of the President’s attention.233 Lewis’s 
forecast proved to be tragically correct for President Clinton, and it still 
nags Justice Stevens.234 
A federal appeals panel in Arkansas had rejected President Clinton’s 
plea for immunity from the litigation during his tenure in the White House 
and ordered pretrial proceedings and a possible trial to unfold as they would 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for any private defendant, subject 
only to orders by the district judge to delay particular proceedings because 
of “specific, particularized, clearly articulated presidential duties.”235 Justice 
Stevens concurred when the unanimous Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s 
ruling.236 
Justice Stevens’s ruling against the President made headlines, but the 
press quickly turned to what would happen next in the dramatic political 
saga. By late 1997, attempts by Paula Jones’s lawyers to show a pattern of 
sexual harassment by President Clinton led to court-authorized depositions 
of individuals far afield from Jones’s initial claims. In particular, in 
December 1997, Jones’s lawyers served White House intern Monica S. 
Lewinsky with a subpoena.237 One month later, President Clinton gave a 
deposition discussing his relationship with Lewinsky.238 Allegations that he 
lied in that deposition became part of the articles of impeachment voted on 
by the House of Representatives in December 1998.239 
In light of the damage done to President Clinton as a result of the 
depositions in the Paula Jones case, the charge has lingered that Justice 
Stevens was “naïve” about the case’s dark and intensively partisan political 
backdrop. “It still goes on,” Justice Stevens told me in May 2011.240 In 
2008, veteran Supreme Court correspondent Nina Totenberg said that 
“Stevens . . . had no concept of what politics had become. He came from an 
era when crooked politics meant money, not ideological power.”241 Another 
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commentator, Jeffrey Toobin, summarized Justice Stevens’s determination 
that the Jones litigation was “highly unlikely to occupy any substantial 
amount of [Clinton’s] time,”242 as “an epically incorrect prediction.”243 
Further, Toobin wrote that, “Stevens, who was nearing his eightieth 
birthday cloistered from the hubbub of life in the age of cable news, had not 
anticipated that Jones’s lawsuit would turn into a magnet for the 
[P]resident’s political enemies.”244 
To Justice Stevens, this analysis ignored the facts surrounding the case 
in May 1997 and the limited questions President Clinton had presented in 
his appeal. Justice Stevens complained that many commentators wrote that 
his discussion in Jones “show[ed] how dumb I was, that nobody but the 
village idiot could say something like that, because look what 
happened . . . an awful lot of authors have used that as an example of one of 
the most stupid statements in an opinion in history.”245 
In the interview, Justice Stevens noted that the parameters of the case 
at the time of the Court’s decision simply concerned the rights of Paula 
Jones as a private plaintiff in conflict with the official obligations of the 
President of the United States.246 No member of the district court, the 
appeals court, or the Supreme Court ever heard any testimony or oral 
arguments about a political conspiracy to undermine the President. Monica 
Lewinsky was not at issue in the case the Justice decided.247 “What we held 
in the case was that the trial did not have to be postponed,” Justice Stevens 
said. Contrary to Toobin’s implication, Justice Stevens said, “I said in the 
opinion it’s not likely that the trial itself would take an inordinate amount of 
the President’s time, which I still think is correct.”248 (In April 1998, the 
trial judge dismissed Jones’s suit with no trial.)249 Justice Stevens added 
that, in their oral arguments, attorneys for Paula Jones and President Clinton 
had conceded that the trial court judge could delay depositions if she found 
they interfered with Clinton’s official duties.250 The fate of President 
Clinton rested not on whether there should be depositions in Jones v. 
Clinton, which was not an issue before the Court, but what he said in one of 
the depositions: 
What happened was that he lied at the [Jones] deposition and that [lie] got 
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involved in the Monica Lewinsky stuff. . . . That’s what caused the 
impeachment. Everybody has interpreted it the other way around and said, 
didn’t he [Justice Stevens] realize what a terrible thing this would expose 
[President Clinton] to if he had to give his deposition. That was not the 
issue.251 
In Jones, the Court faced a potential crisis in the presidency and the 
simple rights of a civil litigant with a complaint against the president. 
Justice Stevens maintains that what happened to President Clinton and 
Paula Jones after his ruling bore no relation to the case before the Court or 
his ruling.252 Journalists were not alone in their ex post facto criticism of the 
Jones ruling. In his 2004 memoir, President Clinton called the decision 
“one of the most politically naïve decisions the Supreme Court had made in 
a long time.”253 
Justice Stevens has said that his written opinions should suffice for the 
press and public.254 Given the examples above of his own deviation from 
that rule, it’s important to cite his full comment on this point at the 2007 
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference before concluding with some ideas about 
better Court–news media relations: 
I think it’s entirely appropriate to stay out of the limelight, because, after all, 
we do say an awful lot in our opinions, much more than most of you are 
willing to read. You try to explain your decisions as carefully as you can. That 
is a characteristic of the judiciary. It’s not a characteristic of other branches of 
government. We are unique in our openness and in our duty to explain why we 
make the decisions we do. I think it’s perfectly appropriate for a Justice to say, 
I’ve done the best I can to explain what my job is all about. Read what I’ve 
written. And I don’t have to go around making speeches to try to persuade you 
that there are other reasons for reaching these results.255 
This point of view notwithstanding, Justice Stevens has taken the advantage 
of speaking opportunities to elaborate upon the work of the Court. In my 
view, Justice Stevens and his fellow Justices should welcome these 
opportunities and work to make them more effective. I now turn to 
additional steps that might make the process work better. 
CONCLUSION: “LEARNING ON THE JOB” 
In a September 2005 speech during a symposium held at the Fordham 
University School of Law, Justice Stevens said, “I know that learning on 
the bench has been one of the most important and rewarding aspects of my 
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own experience over the last thirty-five years.”256 What can the news media 
as well as current and future Justices learn from his legacy about the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and the press? “I think for the most 
part, the press has done a good job covering the Court,” Justice Stevens said 
during the interview for this Essay.257 But evidence from Justice Stevens’s 
activities on and off the bench suggests that he and his colleagues, both 
active and retired, might consider a few changes in the relationship between 
the Court and the news media.258 Four proposals deserve attention. 
First, “syllabuses”259 summarizing “bench” opinions released by the 
Court on decision days260 could be written for a broad audience. Second, an 
idea from the 1960s in which the legal community would provide 
individuals to answer reporters’ questions about Court decisions on 
deadline might be revisited. In this same vein, a third proposal would space 
the release of Court rulings over more days to reduce the release of 
newsworthy rulings on the same day. Fourth, Justices who, like Justice 
Stevens, speak almost exclusively to professional law groups and scholarly 
audiences should consider a change of venue to include nonpartisan 
organizations of journalists and media executives. By making the Court’s 
work more widely accessible under media deadline pressures, the first three 
changes could increase the number of mass media reporters covering the 
Court, beyond the dozen or so full-time Supreme Court correspondents. The 
fourth idea could broaden the professional sphere of the Justices’ 
interactions to include those who, for better or worse, act as their Greek 
chorus. 
As to my first proposal, syllabuses are written by the Supreme Court’s 
“Reporter of Decisions”261 in a style that serves Court experts in the bar and 
academia but almost no one else. Justice Ginsburg, in her Georgetown Law 
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Center speech, called them “an almost press-release-style summary [that] 
can assist the reporter to get it right.”262 Clearly, Justice Ginsburg has not 
read many effective press releases. In an interview with The National Law 
Journal, Frank D. Wagner, who retired in 2010 after more than twenty-
three years as the Court’s Reporter of Decisions, said: “[S]yllabus 
preparation often involves taking an electronic copy of the majority opinion 
and boiling it down and down and down until we’re left with the case’s 
essence, its bare bones.”263 This electronic boiling down process, which is 
reviewed and frequently edited by the Justice who wrote the opinion,264 
hardly represents an arm’s length, fresh look at an opinion using the 
journalist’s inverted pyramid style of presenting the most important 
information first. Institutionally speaking, it is not surprising that staff 
members in the Reporter of Decisions’ office do not stray far from their 
Justices’ texts. “It’s a safer course, but not the most useful,” said Michael 
Eric Herz, a law professor at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New 
York City.265 Given that the syllabuses may not be cited as judicial 
authority, more user-friendly summaries could be prepared that would serve 
as an effective gateway to the full opinion instead of a barrier. The dense 
opening paragraph of the syllabus to the highly controversial Citizens 
United v. FEC ruling in 2010 provided no clue about the essence of the 
opinion.266 
In a violation of a basic journalism rule about lead writing, nowhere in 
the lead paragraph do we learn, so to speak, that the victims of the crime 
died; that is to say, that the Court overruled decades-old limitations on 
electioneering spending by labor unions and corporations. Most of the 
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Court’s opinions introduced by a syllabus contain a disclaimer that the 
syllabus “constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.” 
Professor Herz said syllabuses have become longer and more complex, not 
more convenient.267 Of course, things could be worse. Thousands of 
television viewers will recall the media scramble to interpret the Court’s 
late-night bench opinions in Bush v. Gore268 on December 12, 2000. 
Reporters fumbled live and on air though sixty-five pages handed to them at 
10:00 PM by runners from the Court building, in a chaotic effort to grasp 
the main point of the decision.269 There was no syllabus.270 The New York 
Times’s next-day coverage of this frenzy appeared under the headline 
“Once Again, the TV Mystery Prevails as Late-Night Fare.”271 
In 1986, Justice Stevens authored what may be the shortest opinion by 
the Court in decades,272 McLaughlin v. United States, concerning whether 
an unloaded handgun displayed during a robbery constituted a “dangerous 
weapon” that would make the defendant eligible for an enhanced penalty.273 
The five-paragraph opinion was introduced by a perfectly comprehensible 
two-sentence summary followed by a single word, “Affirmed.”274 
Asked during a 2007 video interview why there is not more such 
 
267  Telephone Interview with Michael Eric Herz, supra note 265. 
268  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
269  Peter Marks, The Media: Once Again, the TV Mystery Prevails as Late-Night Fare, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2000, at A1; see also, Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush 
v. Gore, 35 AKRON L. REV. 185, 185–186 (2002) (describing the chaos that ensued in the hours after the 
Court released its decision). 
270  “It definitely did not contain a syllabus,” recalled legal affairs writer Jeffrey Toobin, who was on 
the scene. E-mail from Jeffrey Toobin, Sr. Analyst, CNN Worldwide, to author (July 10, 2011, 4:34 
AM) (on file with author). Linda Greenhouse, who also was in the media gaggle, said: “That was part of 
the cause of the massive confusion in the press corps. Remember that the decision was styled “‘per 
curiam,’ without the author’s name, and per curiam decisions typically don’t have a syllabus.” E-mail 
from Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Correspondent, N.Y. Times, to author (July 8, 2011, 10:43 PM) 
(on file with author). 
271  Marks, supra note 269; see also Herz, supra note 269 (discussing some of the news media 
coverage of the scramble). 
272  Bryan A. Garner, The Style of Supreme Court Opinions, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 107, at 706, 709; see also Interview by Bryan A. 
Garner with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., available at 
http://lawprose.org/interviews/supreme-court.php?vid=stevens_part_1&vidtitle=Associate_Justice_
John_Paul_Stevens_Part_1. 
273  476 U.S. 16, 16–17 & n.1 (1986). 
274  The summary reads: 
 On the basis of his display of an unloaded handgun in the course of a bank robbery, petitioner 
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), which provides an enhanced penalty for assault by use 
of a “dangerous weapon” during a bank robbery. 
 Held: An unloaded handgun is a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of § 2113(d). Pp. 
17–18. 
 Affirmed. 
Id. at 16. 
106:657  (2012) Justice Stevens and the News Media 
 695 
brevity in the opinion-writing process, Justice Stevens replied in jest, “I 
guess I haven’t written many more.”275 The complexity of most 
controversies that find their way to the Court require greater exposition in a 
syllabus as well as the opinions of the Justices. Yet McLaughlin represents 
the holy grail for journalists covering the Court and others seeking clear, 
concise communication by the Justices. Since the days of Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, the Court’s rules require petitions for certiorari and appeal 
briefs to state the question or questions for the Court “on the first page 
following the cover, and no other information may appear on that page.”276 
A similar rule requiring the Court’s answer(s) to be presented briefly in 
syllabuses and majority opinions would be a giant step toward better public 
understanding. 
Regarding my second proposal, in 1964, the American Association of 
Law Schools (AALS) began an educational program that provided expert 
analysis of pending Supreme Court cases prepared as background for 
reporters.277 The brief undertaking placed law professors in the Court’s 
pressroom to answer questions after opinions were released.278 This idea 
quickly ran into snags. Chief Justice Earl Warren did not like the idea 
“because of concern that such interpretation could be construed as coming 
from the Court.”279 Still, the first thing reporters covering a breaking story 
want to do is talk directly to the experts on the subject, whether it’s a fire 
chief at a fire, an economist after the release of a labor department 
unemployment report, or a legislator after an important vote. 
The AALS program of placing professors in the Court’s pressroom 
was well intended, except that the reporters who might have benefited most 
were not in the Court’s pressroom. They were scattered far and wide, 
reading wire service headlines about Court decisions and wondering if there 
could be a unique story for them and their readers. Today, interactive 
webinars and conference calls going live on the Internet as soon as possible 
after the release of Court decisions could put these journalists in the loop 
while keeping the Justices out—a double win for the independence of the 
press and the judiciary. 
My third proposal, a staggered release by the Court of multiple 
newsworthy decisions, reflects a longstanding complaint by journalists.280 
 
275  Interview by Bryan A. Garner with John Paul Stevens, supra note 272, at 4:17–4:38. 
276  SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a), 24(1)(a), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/
2010RulesoftheCourt.pdf; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE 25, 83 
(2008) (providing background and commentary on the first-page rule); JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE 
CHIEFS 152–53 (2011) (crediting Chief Justice Burger for the first-page rule). 
277  DAVID L. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 132–33 (1968). 
278  Id. 
279  Id. 
280  Id. at 144–45; see also Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at 
the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1558 (1996) (“The last day of the 1987–1988 Term was a 
journalistic nightmare that has attained the status of legend. The Court issued nine decisions that filled 
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Coverage of the Court’s work could only improve if opinions were handed 
down more frequently, with an eye toward avoiding more than one major 
decision on the same day. 
Finally, several current Justices have been criticized for addressing 
partisan organizations during the October 2010 Term.281 “As much as any 
string of decisions, this has been a central story line of the [T]erm,” wrote 
Jeff Shesol, deputy chief speech writer for President Bill Clinton and author 
of Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. the Supreme Court.282 But there’s 
no ethical or other reason why Justice Stevens could not have delivered his 
Judicial Predilections speech, and The Gannett Case in Perspective speech, 
to nonpartisan professional audiences of newspaper editors, television 
producers, or Internet bloggers. Indeed, his important message about the 
separation of judicial review from public policymaking and his complaints 
about news coverage of the Court were better suited for media audiences 
than law schools or other law organizations. 
Supreme Court reporter Dahlia Lithwick of Slate.com had some fun 
with what she sees as a recent trend among Justices to step more eagerly 
into the press spotlight: “[W]hy are the [J]ustices suddenly seeking media 
exposure like Paris Hilton? . . . Justices [have] storm[ed] into television 
studios like Iraqi insurgents into Anbar province.”283 She cited Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s appearances on the Charlie Rose Show (October 26, 
2005) and Fox News Sunday (December 3, 2006); Justice Ruth Ginsburg’s 
interview with Mike Wallace of CBS News (February 11, 2009); Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.’s appearance on ABC News’s Nightline 
(November 14, 2006); and Justice Stevens’s appearance on Nightline 
(January 2, 2007).284 
Lithwick offered the following explanation for the Justices’ apparent 
pursuit of increased media exposure: 
Clearly they’re concerned about being seen as remote and out-of-
touch. . . . The [J]ustices have long claimed that the Court is the most open of 
the branches because they must justify their actions in writing. But at some 
point they seem to have collectively realized that America ain’t reading. And 
so, in the fine tradition of the pharmaceutical industry, they have replaced that 
fine print with an infomercial.285 
In this regard, taking the lead of the pharmaceutical industry is a good idea. 
Justice Stevens’s style of communicating beyond his written opinions 
 
446 pages in the United States Reports, including a number of important cases . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
281  Jeff Shesol, Op-Ed., Should Justices Keep Their Opinions to Themselves?, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 
2011, at A23. 
282  Id. 
283  Dahlia Lithwick, Why Are the Justices Popping Up All over the Tube?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 7, 
2007. 
284  Id. 
285  Id. 
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is well suited for the Justices who follow him if they choose to engage in 
more expansive Supreme Court–news media relations. His speeches are 
nearly always expositions of the Court’s work, not remarks about himself or 
appeals to political or judicial ideology. Even at a gala event by the 2010 
Chicago Bar Association to celebrate his retirement, held in the South 
Michigan Avenue hotel built by his father and grandfather in the 1920s,286 
Justice Stevens offered commentary on four recent cases from which he 
dissented, with almost no personal comments.287 Seriousness of purpose is 
an appropriate characteristic of extrajudicial communications by a Supreme 
Court Justice. Still, conveying the work of the Court beyond the small 
community of Court watchers requires exposure to a larger venue. In 
retirement, Justice Stevens has written a book.288 He has been interviewed 
for broadcast on the subject of longevity by an affiliate of AARP.289 He has 
written about death penalty jurisprudence for the New York Review of 
Books.290 Free of the work of a sitting Justice, he has shown the way for 
better relations with the press and public by his sitting colleagues and those 
who follow. None of his recent outreach is beyond the time constraints of 
active Justices. Each has improved public accessibility to the Court. None 
has diminished the Court’s stature or independence. 
Justice Stevens has even had some fun. One exception to my 
“seriousness of purpose” proscription above occurred at his post-retirement 
speech to Chicago’s Better Government Association in October 2010, when 
he delighted his audience with extemporaneous remarks about his favorite 
baseball team: 
I wrote out a week or so ago a learned statement about stare decisis that would 
be fascinating to scholars . . . for the evening. . . . But as the day has gone on, I 
thought it might be more appropriate to talk a little bit about the Chicago 
Cubs.291 
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States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
288  STEVENS, supra note 276. 
289  Inside E Street: John Paul Stevens Discusses Longevity (AARP television broadcast July 5, 
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